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We use detailed information about wages, education and occupations to shed light on the evolution
of the U.S. financial sector over the past century. We uncover a set of new, interrelated stylized facts:
financial jobs were relatively skill intensive, complex, and highly paid until the 1930s and after the
1980s, but not in the interim period. We investigate the determinants of this evolution and find that
financial deregulation and corporate activities linked to IPOs and credit risk increase the demand for
skills in financial jobs. Computers and information technology play a more limited role. Our analysis
also shows that wages in finance were excessively high around 1930 and from the mid 1990s until
2006. For the recent period we estimate that rents accounted for 30% to 50% of the wage differential
between the financial sector and the rest of the private sector.
Thomas Philippon
NYU Stern School of Business
Department of Finance
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-190






2015 Ivy Rd., Room 312
Charlottesville, VA 22903
ariellr@virginia.eduWe study the evolution of human capital in the U.S. ﬁnancial industry over the past century.
Our analysis sheds light on how the ﬁnancial sector performs its economic role, on its
interactions with the rest of the economy, and on the consequences of ﬁnancial regulation.
We make three contributions. First, we document a set of new, interrelated stylized facts
about the evolution of skill intensity, wages, organization, and occupational complexity
in the ﬁnancial industry. Second, we identify the forces that determine these evolutions.
We ﬁnd that tighter regulations reduce the demand for skilled workers, while complex
corporate activities (IPOs, credit risk) increase the demand for skills. Finally, we analyze
the sustainability of high wages in ﬁnance, and we ﬁnd that 30% to 50% of wage diﬀerentials
observed in the past 10 years can be attributed to rents, and can be expected to disappear.
An industry can be studied from the perspective of the output it produces (products
and innovations) or from the perspective of the inputs it uses (labor, capital, intermediate
inputs). For manufacturing industries, as well as many services industries (e.g. health
care), researchers can obtain reasonably accurate data both on the input and on the output
sides. For example, one can measure the number of cars being produced, or the health
of various individuals. For the ﬁnancial services industry, however, the output side oﬀers
limited information. Most of the literature relies on simple ratios to measure ﬁnancial
output: credit relative to GDP, loans per employee, etc. These measures are useful to study
t h ei m p a c to fﬁnancial development on economic growth (see Levine (2005) for a survey);
however, they tell us little about the evolution of the ﬁnancial sector, its organization, or
even its eﬃciency. For example, changes in the volume of loans per-employee do not contain
much information about the evolution of the ﬁnancial industry if we cannot control for the
complexity of the loans being processed by the employees. It is easier to make loans against
tangible assets than against intangible assets, or to assess the credit worthiness of a well
established ﬁrm than the credit worthiness of a new, innovative ﬁrm.
Another way to look at the output side of an industry is to study new products and
innovations. Indeed, the importance of ﬁnancial innovation has been emphasized by Silber
(1983), Miller (1986), Tufano (1989), Merton (1992), and Lerner (2006), among others. Un-
fortunately, studying ﬁnancial innovation is just as diﬃcult as obtaining sensible measures
of ﬁnancial productivity. There are thousands of studies of innovation in manufacturing in-
dustries, but Frame and White (2004) ﬁnd only 39 empirical articles on ﬁnancial innovation.
2This dearth of empirical evidence is certainly due to the fact that two major sources of data
on manufacturing innovation, namely R&D spending and patents, are mostly useless for
studying ﬁnancial innovation. Financial ﬁrms typically do not report any R&D spending,
and, until recently, could not protect their new ideas through patents (Lerner (2006)).
These diﬃculties in measuring ﬁnancial output limit our understanding of ﬁnancial
development. While it is well established that ﬁnancial development matters for growth
(Levine (2005)), researchers have not yet been able to describe systematic changes in the
nature and delivery of ﬁnancial services. Consider the U.S. experience: how should one
compare the ﬁnancial industry of 1920s with that of the 1960s or 1990s? We know that
macroeconomic conditions and ﬁnancial regulation have changed, but we do not know if and
how they have aﬀected the ﬁnancial industry because we do not know how to measure what
happens inside the black box of this industry. This inability to measure ﬁnancial activity
limits our understanding of the eﬀects of regulation and technological change. Ultimately
it also limits our understanding of how ﬁnancial and economic development interact.
In this paper we propose using the input side of the ﬁnancial industry in order to
understand its evolution. In equilibrium, input and output choices are linked by the common
objective of proﬁt maximization. We argue that the choice of skill intensity and the set of
tasks performed shed light on the evolution of the ﬁnancial industry. Our strategy is akin to
that of researchers in physics who, knowing that they cannot directly observe some particle,
focus on outside interactions and indirect evidence in order to improve their understanding
of the particle of interest.
Our analysis reveals a set of new stylized facts. First, the relative skill intensity and
relative wages of the ﬁnancial sector exhibit a U-shaped pattern from 1909 to 2006. From
1909 to 1933 the ﬁnancial sector was a high skill, high wage industry. A dramatic shift
occurred during the 1930s: the ﬁnancial sector rapidly lost its high human capital and its
wage premium relative to the rest of the private sector. The decline continued at a more
moderate pace from 1950 to 1980. By that time, wages in the ﬁnancial sector were similar,
on average, to wages in the rest of the economy. From 1980 onward, another dramatic
shift occurred. The ﬁnancial sector became once again a high skill, high wage industry.
Strikingly, by the end of the sample relative wages and relative education levels went back
almost exactly to their pre-1930s levels.
3Using micro data on occupations, we create indices to measure the complexity of the
tasks performed by the ﬁnancial industry. Using this index, we document a similar U-shaped
pattern over the past century: ﬁnancial jobs were relatively more complex and non-routine
than non-ﬁnancial jobs before 1930 and after 1980, but not in the middle of the sample.
We then seek to explain these new stylized facts. In particular, we try to identify
the forces responsible for the evolution of human capital in the ﬁnancial industry. Our
investigation of the causes of this pattern reveals a very tight link between deregulation
and human capital in the ﬁnancial sector. Highly skilled labor left the ﬁnancial sector
in the wake of the Depression era regulations, and started ﬂowing back precisely when
these regulations were removed. This link holds both for ﬁnance as a whole, as well as
for subsectors within ﬁnance. Along with our relative complexity indices, this suggests
that regulation inhibits the ability to exploit the creativity and innovation of educated and
skilled workers. Deregulation unleashes creativity and innovation and increases demand for
skilled workers.
The second set of forces that appear to have a large inﬂuence on the demand for skills
in ﬁnance are non-ﬁnancial corporate activities: in particular, IPOs and credit risk. New
ﬁrms are diﬃcult to value because they are often associated with new technologies or new
business models, and also for the obvious reason that they do not have a track record.
Similarly, pricing and hedging risky debt is an order of magnitude harder than pricing and
hedging government debt. Indeed, we ﬁnd that increases in aggregate IPO activities and
credit risk predict increases in human capital intensity in the ﬁnancial industry. Computers
and information technology also play a role, albeit a more limited one. Contrary to common
wisdom, computers cannot account for the evolution of the ﬁnancial industry. The ﬁnancial
industry of the 1920s appears remarkably similar to the ﬁnancial industry of the 1990s
despite the lack of computers in the early part of the sample.
Having documented the evolution of human capital and jobs in the ﬁnancial industry, as
well as the set of factors that can explain this evolution, our last contribution is to study the
sustainability of the high wages observed in the ﬁnancial industry. Has ﬁnancial creativity
been over compensated? We construct a benchmark series for the relative wage in ﬁnance,
controlling for education and employment risk as well as time varying returns to education.
Our benchmark wage accounts well for the observed relative wage between 1910 and 1920,
4and from 1950 to 1990. From the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s, and from the mid-1990s
to 2006, however, the compensation of employees in the ﬁnancial industry appears to be
too high to be consistent with a sustainable labor market equilibrium. Moreover, in the
recent period, we show that this result remains even if we control for unobserved individual
heterogeneity. This ﬁnding is prima facie evidence that the ﬁnancial sector is not in a
sustainable labor market equilibrium, and that short term rents are likely to diminish.
Our main contribution is to shed light on the inner evolution of the ﬁnancial industry.
Our work also contributes to the understanding of relative demand for skilled labor and
income inequality (see Goldin and Katz (2008a)). Katz and Murphy (1992) study the
secular growth in the demand for educated workers from 1963 to 1987, while Autor, Katz,
and Krueger (1998) and Acemoglu (1998), among others, discuss the role of technological
improvements that are biased in favor of skilled workers.1 By taking a longer perspective
than most previous studies and focusing on a particular sector, we show that computers
and information technology are not the only source of increased demand for (and returns
to) skilled workers.2
We also contribute to the literature on the allocation of talent. Economic growth requires
the allocation of talent to socially productive activities. Baumol (1990) argues that the
allocation of talent across occupations is more readily inﬂuenced by institutions and private
economic incentives than the overall supply of talent. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991)
make a similar point, and also discuss the role of increasing returns to ability in determining
the careers of talented individuals. Our results support these arguments since we show the
ﬁrst order eﬀects of regulations on the human capital intensity of the ﬁnancial industry.
Our ﬁndings are also consistent with Kostovetsky (2007), who presents evidence about
brain drain of top managers from mutual funds to less-regulated hedge funds, starting in
the early 1990s. Kaplan and Rauh (2007) study the evolution of earnings of individuals with
very high incomes with a particular emphasis on the ﬁnancial sector, and Goldin and Katz
(2008b) document a large increase in the fraction of Harvard undergraduates who work in
the ﬁnancial sector since 1970. Frydman and Saks (2007) share our long run perspective
1Acemoglu (2002) reviews the literature on skill biased technological change. For other explanations for
the increase in demand for skilled workers see Card (1992), Card and Lemieux (2001), Acemoglu, Aghion,
and Violante (2001) and Buera and Kaboski (2006).
2Krueger (1993) reports evidence that shows that workers who used computers in 1984-1989 earned more.
5in their study of executive compensation. Our analysis highlights more speciﬁcally the role
of regulation and corporate ﬁnance in determining the relative demand for skilled labor in
ﬁnance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the new stylized facts
that we have discovered. Section 2 provides historical evidence on the eﬀect of regulation,
technology and ﬁnancial innovation on wages and skill composition. Identiﬁcation and
causality are discussed in Section 2.6. Section 3 addresses the question of whether ﬁnanciers
are overpaid. Section 4 concludes. In the text we restrict descriptions of data sources and
series construction to the minimum; detailed descriptions of data sources and methodologies
can be found in the appendix.
1 New stylized facts
In this section we describe the evolution of wages, education and jobs in the U.S. ﬁnancial
sector from 1909 to 2006. The ﬁnancial sector is comprised of three subsectors: Credit
Intermediation (by banks, savings institutions, and ﬁnancial companies providing credit
services), Insurance (life and property), and Other Finance (securities, commodities, venture
capital, private equity, hedge funds, trusts, and other ﬁnancial investment industry, as well
as investment banks).3 Our examination of the historical data from 1909 to 2006 reveals
a U-shaped pattern for education, wages, and the complexity of tasks performed in the
ﬁnancial industry — all relative to the nonfarm private sector. These facts have not been
previously documented.
1.1 Education and wages
Education: 1910-2005
We construct our education series for the nonfarm private sector and for the ﬁnancial sector
using U.S. Census data, and using the Current Population Survey (henceforth CPS). Census
data covers the period 1910-2000 and the CPS covers the period 1967-2005. Our concept of
education is the share of employees with (strictly) more than high school education.4 For the
3We do not include the real estate sector because it is conceptually diﬀerent from credit intermediation
or investment banking. Our results on wages and education would not change if we included real estate,
however, because it is a small fraction of wages and employment.
4The results are virtually unchanged if we use the share of college graduates. The share of employees
6period 1910-1930, where schooling data is not available, we impute the share of employees
with more than high school education by occupation, and then aggregate separately for the
nonfarm private sector and for the ﬁnancial sector.5 For the period 1940-1970 we use the
Census data directly. For the period 1970-2005, we use CPS data6.
Let high denote high skill workers and let highi,t be a dummy variable for having strictly
more than high school education for employee i at time t. Then the share of high skilled









where λi,t is the sampling weight for employee i in period t and i ∈ s means that individual
i works in sector s. The relative education of the ﬁnancial sector is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between this share in ﬁnance (s = fin) and the corresponding share in the nonfarm private
sector (s = nonfarm):
ρfin,t ≡ highfin,t− highnonfarm,t . (2)
Wages: 1909-2006
We construct a full time equivalent wage series for the period 1909-2006. The full time
equivalent concept implies that variation in hours worked does not play a role. For the period
1929-2006, we construct full-time equivalent wages from the Annual Industry Accounts of
the United States, published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We extend the
series using data from Kuznets (1941) and Martin (1939) for the period 1909-1929. The
data are described in details in the appendix. The average wage in the ﬁnancial industry





U-shape over the 20th century
with more than high school education is a more relevant concept of skill for the entire sample.
5See the appendix for details. In this construction have assumed that the average educational attainment
within occupations has not changed from 1910 to 1940. While this is certainly a strong assumption, we
believe that it is made less critical by the fact that we focus on relative education of ﬁnance versus the
nonfarm private sector. By construction, our measure is not aﬀected by a general drift in educational
attainment in all occupations over time.
6For the overlapping period 1970-2000 the diﬀerences between the Census and CPS data are negligible.
7Figure 1 shows the evolution of the relative wage, ωfin,t, and relative education, ρfin,t,
over the 20th century. The pattern that emerges is U-shaped, and suggests three distinct
periods. From 1909 to 1933 the ﬁnancial sector was a high-education, high-wage industry.
It had 17 percent points more educated workers relative to the private sector; these workers
were paid at least 50% more than in the rest of the private sector, on average. A dramatic
shift occurred during the 1930s. The ﬁnancial sector started to lose its human capital and
its high wage status. Most of the decline occurred by 1950, but continued until 1980. By
that time, the relative wage in the ﬁnancial sector was approximately the same as in the
rest of the economy. From 1980 onwards another dramatic shift occurred. The ﬁnancial
sector became a high-skill high-wage industry again. In a striking reversal, its relative wage
and education went back almost exactly to their levels of the 1930s.7
1.2 Subsectors
In this section we investigate the role of the subsector composition of ﬁnance on the patterns
of Figure 1. The source for full time equivalent employment and wages for each subsector
is the Annual Industry Accounts of the United States.
Panel A of Figure 2 depicts the evolution of employment shares within the ﬁnancial in-
dustry. The shares of Credit Intermediation and Other Finance decline relative to Insurance
during the Great Depression. In the post-War period the share of Insurance declines lin-
early. Credit Intermediation gains in importance until 1980 and declines afterwards. Other
Finance grows more rapidly after 1980.
Panel B of Figure 2 depicts the evolution of relative wages. These were calculated as the
ratio of the wage bill share in each subsector relative to its full-time-equivalent employment
share. Once again, we see a common downward trend in relative wages starting in the late
1930s. The decline continues more moderately for Credit Intermediation and Insurance
until 1985, where a steady recovery commences. The pattern is slightly diﬀerent for Other
Finance, where the initial decline is deeper, but stops completely by 1940. In 1980 the
relative wage in Other Finance starts a steep increase, until it completely dwarfs those of
the other two subsectors.
7We ﬁnd the tight relationship between the relative education series and the relative wage series an
indication that the data sources are consistent, in particualr in the begining of the sample. If skilled workers
command higher wages, then this is exactly what you would expect.
8We wish to evaluate the relative role of changes in the subsector composition on the
relative wage of ﬁnance. To do so we decompose the change in the relative wage of ﬁnance








where i is an index for subsectors. ∆ωi is the change of the relative wage of subsector i, ni
is the average employment share of i within ﬁnance, ∆ni is the change in the employment
share of i within ﬁnance, and ωi is the average relative wage of i in the sample. The ﬁrst
sum captures the contribution of within-categories changes in the relative wage, while the
second sum is the the contribution of employment reallocation between subsectors.8
We report the results of the decomposition in Table 1. The message is clear: almost all of
the changes in relative wages come from the ‘within’ component. Thus, changes in sectorial
composition do not account for changes in the relative wage of the ﬁnancial industry.
1.3 Education and occupations
Economic theory calls for decompositions based on tasks and occupations.9 Indeed, we will
show that tasks and occupations paint a much more relevant picture of the evolution of the
ﬁnancial industry than the more usual sectorial decompositions.
We ﬁrst revisit the within-between decomposition of equation (4) using CPS data over
1980-2005. The CPS data allow us to break down the ﬁnancial industry not only by sub-
sectors, but also by education and occupations groups. The educational categories we chose
are “Less than 12 years of schooling”, “High School Graduate”, “13-15 Years of School-
ing”, “College Graduate” (4-year college) and “More than College” (graduate degrees, such
as JD, MBA, Ph.D.). Our classiﬁcation of occupations attempts to group employees ac-
cording to the tasks that they perform. We use seven occupational categories: “Managers
and Professionals”, “Mathematics and Computers”, “Insurance Specialists”, “Brokers and
8We use this decomposition in three subsamples: 1933-1960, 1960-1980 and 1980-2005. We choose 1933
as the starting point because of the importance of the Glass-Steagall Act, which was legislated in that year.
1960 marks the beginning of the most regulated period in ﬁnance, while 1980 marks the beginning of the
least regulated one.
9While sectorial analysis is common in economics, this is mostly because sectorial data are readily avail-
able. It is not clear, however, whether distinctions based on SIC codes are relevant or arbitrary. For instance,
does it really matter whether a trader works for an insurance company, a commercial bank, or a hedge fund?
9Traders”, “Bank Tellers”, “Administration, Including Clerks”, and “All the Rest” (jani-
tors, security and miscellaneous).10 We focus on the 1980 to 2005 period where the most
important changes take place.
We decompose the increase in the relative wage of the ﬁnancial industry using equation
(4). The index i now varies across either subsectors, education categories or occupations.
The subsector and occupation categories are described above.
We report the results of the decomposition in Table 2. Panel A conﬁrms our previous
ﬁnding regarding changes in the relative wage: composition eﬀects across subsectors are
dominated by within-sector eﬀects. By contrast, in Panels B and C we see that most of the
increase in the relative wage in ﬁnance is due to reallocation of labor across education and
occupation categories: the “between” component is much higher in Panels B and C than in
Panel A. Organizational changes within each subsector are therefore more important than
changes in sectorial composition. This provides strong support for our focus on occupations
in the following section.
But before continuing, it is worth pointing out a shortcoming of CPS data: wages are
top coded. Top coding is twice as likely in Credit Intermediation and Insurance relative to
the private sector; in Other Finance it is 13 times as likely. This leads to under estimation
of relative wages in the ﬁnancial sector.11 Thus, while in the Industry Accounts the relative
wage of ﬁnance increases by 0.65 from 1.03 in 1980 to 1.68 in 2005, in the CPS it increases
only by 0.43.12 Therefore, the wages that we report may not be accurate for certain occu-
pations, Brokers and Traders in particular. We refer the reader to Kaplan and Rauh (2007)
for a detailed analysis of the highest incomes inside and outside ﬁnance. Top coding also
probably explains the diﬀerences between Panel C of Table 1 and Panel A of Table 2, since
very high incomes contribute more to the ‘within’ component.
1.4 Complexity
The analysis in Table 2 underscores the importance of changes in the set of occupations
within the ﬁnancial industry. The next step is to link occupations to the tasks performed
10Unfortunately, it is hard to ﬁnd consistent deﬁnitions of occupations over time. The appendix explains
in details what we did, the constraints we faced and the reasons for our choices.
11For technical reasons, the problem is more acute after 1996. See the appendix for complete details.
12The problem is most severe in Other Finance, where the Industry Accounts show an increase in relative
wages of 2.5 from 1.1 in 1980 to 3.6 in 2005, in the CPS it increases only by 0.38.
10by the industry. The challenge is to construct a consistent and informative measure over
the whole sample. This is what we turn to now.
We rely on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to study the nature of occu-
pations. Each occupation is characterized by a vector of ﬁve DOT task intensities: Finger
Dexterity (routine manual tasks); Set Limits, Tolerances and Standards (routine cognitive
tasks); Math Aptitude (analytical thinking); Direction, Control and Planning (communica-
tion and decision making); and Eye-Hand-Foot Coordination (non-routine manual tasks).13
Each task intensity is a number between 0 and 10. The DOT task intensities were calculated
by a panel of experts from the National Academy of Sciences based on information about
occupations in 1970.14
While every occupation may combine all ﬁve tasks to some degree of intensity, the
following examples can help ﬁx ideas and facilitate the interpretation. Production line
workers have high Finger Dexterity intensity; clerks and administrative workers have high
Set Limits, Tolerances and Standards intensity; economists exhibit high Math Aptitude;
mangers and sales persons have a high Direction, Control and Planning intensity; truck
drivers and janitors have high Eye-Hand-Foot Coordination intensity.
We match the DOT task intensities to individuals in the U.S. Censuses from 1910 to
2000 and in the 2008 March Current Population Survey (which pertains to 2007) by occu-
pation. In order to match the DOT task intensities to individuals we created a consistent
occupational classiﬁcation throughout the sample.15 In doing so we assume that occupa-
tions’ characteristics are stable over our sample. While this is certainly a strong assumption,
we believe that it is made less critical by the fact that we focus on the relative DOT scores
of ﬁnance versus the nonfarm private sector. By construction, our measure is not aﬀected
by a general drift in DOT scores over time.
We restrict our attention to workers of age 15 to 65, who are employed in the nonfarm
private sector.16 Each individual in this sample is characterized by the ﬁve task indices.
13Each one of the ﬁve indices was detected as a principal component for indices that are similar in nature.
For more details see Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003).
14We thank David Autor for sharing with us data on occupational task intensities. The DOT indices that
we use are based on the 1990 Census occupational classiﬁcation, and are further diﬀerentiated by gender.
See the appendix for a complete description.
15We further diﬀerentiate by gender. See appendix for complete details.
16Due to data limitations, in 1920 we could only restrict to individuals who were in the labor force, whether
employed or not.
11For each task and year we create an average intensity by sector
tasks,t =
P
i∈s taski λi,t hrsi,t P
i∈s λi,t hrsi,t
,
where i denotes a particular individual, t denotes the year, λ are sampling weights and
hrs are annual hours worked. The notation i ∈ s means that individual i works in sector
s,w h e r es = fin corresponds to the ﬁnancial sector and s = nonfarm corresponds to
the nonfarm private sector.17 The generic ‘task’v a r i e so v e ra l lﬁve tasks described above.
Relative task intensity for ﬁnance in a given year is given by
rel_taskfin,t ≡ taskfin,t− tasknonfarm,t .
Figure 3 reports the evolution of four relative task intensities (the ﬁfth, relative Eye-
Hand-Foot Coordination, does not change much throughout the sample and is dropped from
the analysis). The ﬁgure conveys a clear message: ﬁnance was relatively more complex and
non-routine in the beginning and end of the sample, but not so in the middle.
Panel A focuses on relative complexity. Finance lost much of its relative analytical
complexity (Math Aptitude) from 1910 to 1950. At that point a slow recovery started,
which accelerated in 1990. Decision making (Direction, Control and Planning) suﬀered
even more in relative terms, but the recovery was much stronger. Panel B conveys the same
message. Routine task intensity became higher in ﬁnance from 1910 to 1930, and started
to decline from 1980 onward. In results that we do not report here, we observe virtually
the same patterns within all three subsectors of ﬁnance.18
1.5 Taking stock of the new facts
Uncovering the historical evolution of wages, education and job complexity in the ﬁnancial
industry is the ﬁrst contribution of our paper.19 In the remainder of the paper, we seek to
explain these new stylized facts. In particular, we try to identify the forces responsible for
the evolution of human capital in the ﬁnancial industry.
17In the 1910-1930 and 1960-1970 Censuses the underlying data used to calculate hrs is missing. Therefore,
in those years we assign hrs =1for all individuals. See the appendix for complete details.
18The relative decrease and increase in complexity is strongest within Other Finance. However, data is
noisy for routine tasks in Other Finance, due to few observations of workers who perform those tasks most
intensively in that subsector. The pattern for Direction, Control and Planning in Insurance slightly diﬀers
from the aggregate pattern for ﬁnance. These results are available by request.
19This pattern is similar to the one for CEO compensation documented by Frydman and Saks (2007).
12It is worth mentioning at the outset that the historical evidence places strong restrictions
on the set of plausible explanations for the evolution of skill and wages in the ﬁnancial sector.
The fact that relative wages and education in ﬁnance were just as high in the 1920s as in
the 1990s rules out technology — in particular information technology — as the main driving
force. There were no computers in private use before 1960. Therefore, the idea that the
growth of wages in ﬁnance is simply the mechanical consequence of the IT revolution is
inconsistent with the historical evidence.
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) argue that computers are complementary to complex
tasks (non-routine cognitive) and substitutes for routine tasks. Therefore, the argument
goes, we should see increases in complexity (non-routine cognitive intensity) and decreases
in routine task intensity in industries that exhibit increases in IT and software intensity.
Figure 3 shows that for ﬁnance this cannot be the main driving force, because this theory
cannot explain the decline in complexity in the earlier part of the sample.
The historical stylized facts also rule out some simple macroeconomic explanations. For
instance, the average price/earnings ratio and the ratio of stock market to GDP are not
very correlated with the relative wage series.20 T h es a m ei st r u eo ft h er a t i oo ft r a d et o
GDP.
We proceed as follows. We ﬁrst provide a simple economic framework to think about
the demand for skill in ﬁnancial services. Then we try to identify the forces that determine
wages and education in the ﬁnancial industry. Finally, we ask whether the high wages
observed in the early 2000s are sustainable.
2 Determinants of relative education and wages
In this section we provide a simple economic framework to think about the demand for skill
in ﬁnancial services. We then present evidence on the determinants of relative education
and wages in the historical perspective.
20There is a stock market boom in the 1960s, and a collapse after 2001. Overall, the correlation with the
relative wage series is small.
132.1 A simple framework
We use a simple model of the demand for skill to organize the discussion. Suppose that







where As,t measures the productivity of sector s at time t,a n dh and l are hours worked
by high education and low education workers, respectively. The parameter μs,t captures
the relative productivity of highly educated workers in sector s at time t.L e twh,t and wl,t
be the hourly wages for high and low education workers. Assuming that the function f is
homogenous of degree one, cost minimization implies that the relative demand for skilled









The demanded share of educated workers depends negatively on the education wage pre-
mium, and positively on the relative eﬃciency of skilled labor μ.
The parameter μ can be aﬀected by technological innovations and organizational choices.
There is strong evidence of a secular trend in μ for the aggregate economy (see Goldin and
Katz (2008a)). However, we are interested in the behavior of the ﬁnancial sector relative to
the rest of the economy. A linear approximation to equation (6) leads to




+ εt , (7)
where ρfin,t is deﬁned above in (2) and β is positive.21 We now turn to the potential
determinants of μfin,t − μnonfarm,t.N o t et h a ti fwh,t >w l,t,t h e na ni n c r e a s ei nρfin,t will
be reﬂected in an increase in ωfin,t as well. In what follows, we investigate the determinants
of both.
It is worthwhile noting at this point that changes in the aggregate skill premium cannot
be the driving force behind ρfin,t. If this were the case, then we would expect a hump
shape, not a U-shape in relative education over the sample. Historically, the aggregate skill
premium declined from 1915 to 1950 and then increased until today, with a brief, small
21We have assumed here that the aggregation function is similar across sectors. We can relax this as-
sumption and control for the education wage premium to allow for diﬀerent elasticities. The results are
unchanged and available upon request.
14decline in 1970-1980 (see Goldin and Katz (2008a), page 300). We observe an increase
in relative education in ﬁnance exactly when the aggregate skill premium increases most
rapidly, staring in 1980: ﬁnance hires relatively more educated people exactly when they
are most expensive. The correct explanations must therefore rely on the relative demand
for skills, which is driven by μfin,t− μnonfarm,t.22
2.2 Explanatory Variables
We investigate the determinants of the skill composition of the workforce in the ﬁnancial
sector. Equation (7) makes it clear that we need to think about what determines the
comparative advantage of skilled labor in ﬁnance relative to the rest of the economy.
Information technology (IT)
It is widely acknowledged that computers can aﬀect the demand for skills. As we mention
above in section 1.5, computers are complementary to complex tasks (non-routine cognitive)
and substitutes for routine tasks (Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003)). As a result, employees
in complex or analytical jobs become relatively more productive, the relative demand for
routine jobs decreases, while manual jobs are less aﬀected. The ﬁnancial sector has been
an early adopter of information technologies. We therefore consider the share of IT and
software in the capital stock of ﬁnancial sector minus that share in the aggregate economy.23
Our measure of relative IT intensity is displayed in Figure 4. This series does not capture
investments in telephones and telegraphs in the early part of the sample.24 We could not
obtain data on the relative stock of telephones in the ﬁnancial industry, but it is diﬃcult to
imagine this stock shrinking from the 1920s to the 1970s, even relative to the private sector.
For lack of data on the pre-War period, we do not use the relative IT and software share
in our time series regression. We will provide evidence on the role of IT at the sub-sector
l e v e li nS e c t i o n2 . 4b e l o w .
Financial patents (pat)
22The aggregate supply of educated workers does not determine the evolution of ρfin,t because it has
increased thoughout the sample.
23The capital stock data are from the BEA’s ﬁxed assets tables by industry.
24Michaels (2007) argues that the advent of early information technology — telephones, typewriters, and
improved ﬁling techniques — in the early 20th century increased the demand for oﬃce workers in manufac-
turing. His data on telephones and typewriters is on production, not use by sector.
15New ﬁnancial products are likely to increase the required skills of ﬁnance employees in
the ﬁnancial industry.25 For instance, pricing and hedging futures and option contracts is
more diﬃcult than pricing and hedging spot contracts. In addition, ﬁnancial innovations
often expand the span over which individuals can apply their skills, making the ﬁnancial
sector more attractive to highly talented individuals, as emphasized by Murphy, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1991).
We use patents used in ﬁnance to measure ﬁnancial innovation. We obtain data on new
patents used in ﬁnance for the period 1909-1996 from the Historical Statistics of the United
States.26 We extend the series to 2002 using data from Lerner (2006). We then normalize
by the total number of patents. The series is displayed in Figure 4.
Corporate ﬁnance activity: IPOs and credit risk (ipo, def)
The entry of new ﬁrms increases the informational requirements from ﬁnancial analysts.
New ﬁrms are diﬃcult to value because they are often associated with new technologies or
new business models, and also for the obvious reason that they do not have a track record.
We therefore expect the intensity of IPOs to increase the returns to skill in the ﬁnancial
sector. We measure IPO activity from 1900 to 2002 using data from Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2005). Speciﬁcally, we use the market value of IPOs divided by the market value of existing
equities. As Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) have shown, IPO activity was strong during
the Electricity Revolution (1900-1930) and during the current IT Revolution.
Another area where ﬁnancial activity has changed dramatically over long periods is
credit risk. Corporate defaults were common until the 1930s, and the market for high yield
debt was large. This market all but disappeared for 30 years, until “junk” bonds appeared
in the 1970s. Pricing and hedging risky debt is an order of magnitude harder than pricing
and hedging government debt. Risky debt aﬀe c t sa l ls i d e so ft h eﬁnancial sector. It is
used to ﬁnance risky ﬁrms with high growth potential. Rating risky debt requires skilled
analysts: this explains the dynamics of rating agencies, which were important players in the
interwar period, small and largely irrelevant in the 1950s and 1960s, and growing fast from
25Silber (1983) reviews new ﬁnancial products and practices between 1970 and 1982. Miller (1986),
reﬂecting upon the ﬁnancial innovations that occurred from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s, argues that the
development of ﬁnancial futures was the most signiﬁcant one. Tufano (2004) argues that other periods have
witnessed equally important innovations.
26C a r t e r ,G a r t n e r ,H a i n e s ,O l m s t e a d ,S u t c h ,a n dW r i g h t( 2 0 0 6 ) .
16the 1970s until today (Sylla (2002)). To measure credit risk, we use a three year moving
average of the U.S. corporate default rate published by Moody’s.
For ease of comparison, we normalize the IPO and credit risk series to have a mean of
zero and unit standard deviation over the sample period. Our measures of non ﬁnancial
corporate activity are displayed in Figure 5.
Deregulation (dereg)
The optimal organization of ﬁrms, and therefore their demand for various skills, depends
on their competitive and regulatory environment, for at least two reasons. First, there is
evidence that competition increases the demand for skill (see Guadalupe (2007) and the
references therein). There is also evidence that organizational change can be skill-biased
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) and Caroli
and Van Reenen (2001)). In addition, a regulated ﬁnancial sector might not be able to take
advantage of highly skilled individuals because of rules and restrictions on the ways ﬁrms
organize their activities. As a result, demand for skill labor is reduced. Deregulation, on
the other hand, increases the scope for skilled workers to operate freely and therefore makes
them relatively more productive.
We construct a measure of ﬁnancial deregulation that takes into account the following:
1. Bank branching restrictions. We use the share of the U.S. population living in states
that have removed intrastate branching restrictions. It is a continuous variable from
0t o1 .
2. Separation of commercial and investment banks. The Glass-Steagall act was legislated
in 1933 and was gradually weakened starting in 1987 until the ﬁnal repeal in 1999.
T h ev a r i a b l ei sb e t w e e n0a n d1 .
3. Interest rate ceilings. Legislation was introduced in 1933 and was removed gradually
between 1980 and 1984. The variable is between 0 and 1.
4. Separation of banks and insurance companies. Legislation was introduced in 1956 and
was repealed in 1999. The variable is between 0 and 1.
See the appendix for complete details. The deregulation index is given by (1)−(2)−(3)−(4)
and is displayed in Figure 6.
172.3 Time series regressions
We regress the relative wage and relative education on the variables described above. To
mitigate endogeneity we use a ﬁve year lag for the dependent variables. The relative edu-
cation equation is
ρfin,t = α + βd × deregt−5 + βp × patt−5 + βipo × ipot−5 + βdef × deft−5 + βtime × t + εt
and the relative wage equation is
ωfin,t = α + βd × deregt−5 + βp × patt−5 + βipo × ipot−5 + βdef × deft−5 + βtime × t + εt .
We do not include the IT variable here because it is not available before 1960. We will
present IT evidence at the subsector level in the next section. The equations include a time
trend and the standard errors are corrected for up to 10 years of autocorrelation.
Table 3 reports the results of the regression. The most robust determinant of both
relative education and relative wages appears to be deregulation. In all speciﬁcations in
Table 3 its eﬀect is stable and always statistically signiﬁcant, and the economic magnitude is
large. In columns (1) and (4), deregulation alone accounts for 90% of changes in education
and 83% of changes in wages.
When adding to our speciﬁcation ﬁnancial innovation in columns (2) and (5) we detect
as i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on relative education but not on relative wages. In columns (3) and (6),
we ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of corporate ﬁnance activity on the demand for skill and on relative
wages, but the eﬀects are only signiﬁcant for wages. It seems that demand for ﬁnancial skills
that are harder to learn (IPO valuation and pricing risk) result in higher wages to those
who have obtained these skills, whereas working with new technologies per se only increases
demand for skilled workers in general. The eﬀect of deregulation is robust to adding these
control variables.
The ﬁnancial deregulation index varies over a span of 4 units over the sample. Using the
estimates from column (3), this translates into 7 percentage points of relative education.
Recall that in Figure 1 relative education variesb ys l i g h t l yl e s st h a n1 0p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t s .
Similarly for wages, we ﬁnd that deregulation appears to be the most important factor.
None of the other controls comes close to having an eﬀect of such large magnitude.
18The time series regressions conﬁrm the strong link between deregulation and skill up-
grading in ﬁnance visible in Figure 6. The timing of the shift suggests a distinct role
for deregulation, because the IT share in the capital stock of the ﬁnancial sector actually
starts increasing in the 1960s. The large organizational changes seem to have waited for
deregulation to take place in 1980.27
2.4 Panel regressions: deregulation and information technology
Our main ﬁnding so far is the importance of deregulation in the determination of the
evolution of relative education and relative wages in ﬁnance as a whole. In this section we
investigate whether this result holds for the three subsectors that comprise the ﬁnancial
sector, namely Credit Intermediation, Insurance and Other Finance.
Unfortunately, we could not obtain time series data on innovations speciﬁct ot h e s e
subsectors. We discuss the role of ﬁnancial innovation below, but do not carry out statistical
tests. In contrast, IT and software capital data is available by subsector from the BEA. In
addition, we construct a deregulation index by sector. We exploit these two series in a panel
of three subsectors within ﬁnance, which we currently turn to.
In order to construct a deregulation index that varies by sector, as well as by time, we
use the components of the deregulation index from section 2.2. These components were (1)
Branching restrictions; (2) Separation of commercial and investment banks (Glass-Steagall);
(3) Interest rate ceilings; and (4) Separation of banks and insurance companies. Our sector-
varying ﬁnancial deregulation index is constructed as follows:
• For Credit Intermediation the index is equal to (1) − (2) − (3).
• For Insurance the index is equal to −(2) − (4).
• For Other Finance the index is equal to −2 × (2) − (3).
27Previous studies have attempted to address organizational change due to bank deregulation across states
in the U.S. The results of these studies are inconclusive. Black and Strahan (2001) show no eﬀect of branching
deregulation across states on the share of managers in banking, whereas Wozniak (2007) does ﬁnd such an
eﬀect, although her set of control variables is not as elaborate as Black and Strahan (2001). In untabulated
results, we replicate both studies. In addition, we ﬁnd that following branching deregulation the share
of managers in banking employment decreases only in states that had strict unit banking laws relative to
banking in other states. This is what one should expect if branching restrictions prevented reaping economies
of scale in management. This result should be interpreted with caution, since it does not capture the eﬀect
of deregulation on the long run trend for more managers in banking.
19Branching aﬀects only Credit Intermediation because it is the subsector that includes banks.
Glass-Steagall aﬀects all subsectors, but we allow the eﬀect to be twice as large for Other
Finance because it changed both the organization of investment banking and competition
within the sector and therefore should have a bigger impact. Interest rate ceilings should not
aﬀect Insurance, while the separation of banks and insurance companies aﬀects insurance
companies more strongly than it aﬀects Credit Intermediation and Other Finance.28
For each subsector we now have a measure of relative wage, relative education, deregu-
lation and the IT and software share in capital by subsector. We use this data to ﬁtp a n e l
regressions with subsector ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies over the post war period.
We report the results in Table 4. We ﬁnd that IT and software intensity is linked to skill
upgrading but the eﬀect on wages is not signiﬁcant. Once again, we ﬁnd that deregulation
has a large eﬀect both on relative education and relative wages. In fact, the eﬀect of
deregulation is economically 1.5 times larger than that of the IT share.29
2.5 Financial innovation
Ideally, we would like to perform for ﬁnancial innovation the same type of cross-sectional
tests that we have just performed for IT in Section 2.4. Unfortunately, we do not have
data on ﬁnancial innovation at the subsector level, and we can only oﬀer anecdotal evidence
by looking at the insurance sector. In terms of wages and education, the insurance sector
has been relatively stable (relative to the rest of the economy). Moreover, one might think
that improvements in computers by themselves aﬀected the insurance sector as much as
the other ﬁnancial sectors, and indeed the IT share in insurance is signiﬁcantly higher
than in the rest of the economy and, if anything, its growth has been faster than in the
Credit Intermediation subsector. Nevertheless, the evolution of wages in Insurance does not
suggest strong skill bias. This is inconsistentw i t hI Tb e i n gt h em a i nd r i v i n gf o r c eb e h i n d
the evolution of skills and wages.
The relative stability of the insurance sector is consistent with the role of ﬁnancial — as
28We have performed robustness checks on the construction of these indices. The results in Table 3 below
are robust to these checks.
29The deregulation variable ranges from -3 to 1 (with a standard deviation of 1.05), while the IT share
variable ranges from 0 to 0.21 (with a standard deviation of 0.06). Combining these with the coeﬃcient
e s t i m a t e sg i v e sa1 . 5l a r g e re ﬀect to IT (also, the beta coeﬃcient to deregulation is 1.33 larger than the
coeﬃcient to IT).
20opposed to technological — innovations. Among the 38 new ﬁnancial products and practices
introduced between 1970 and 1982 listed in Silber (1983), only 2 or 3 are related to Insurance.
This is also consistent with the argument in Miller (1986) on the ultimate importance of
ﬁnancial futures markets relative to other ﬁnancial innovations. These innovations had
a larger impact on other ﬁnancial subsectors, in which we observe stronger relative wage
growth, faster skill upgrading and faster occupational changes.30
2.6 Interpretation of our results
We have entertained other possible determinants for the evolution of relative education and
relative wages over this long horizon. In particular, we have considered international trade,
stock market capitalization (as percent of GDP) and stock returns. None of these variables
has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the skill composition of the ﬁnancial sector. We also looked at
the allocation of value added between labor and capital within the ﬁnancial industry. The
labor share is stable over time. The evolution of relative wages is therefore not driven by
variations in the bargaining power of ﬁnancial workers.31
On the other hand, we would not argue that regulations are exogenous to economic
shocks. Depression era regulations are called that way for a reason. We would nonetheless
argue that the evidence points clearly towards a causal role for regulation, for at least two
reasons. First, while legislators and regulators react to economic shocks, they do not do
so in a mechanical way. Following the crisis of 1929-1933, regulations were tightened and
ﬁnancial wages went down, but following the crisis of 1973-1981, regulations were loosened,
and ﬁnancial wages went up. Therefore, the occurrence of a crisis, high unemployment,
bank failures, or a long bear market have no predictive power for relative wages and skills
employed in ﬁnance, while regulation does.
Second, the timing of changes also suggests a causal role for regulations. The relative
wage did not drop in 1929, or in 1930 following the stock market crash. The relative wage
dropped only after 1934, when new regulations were enforced. Similarly, there was no
sudden change in IT use around 1980, and it is only after deregulation took place that
the relative wage started to increase. The pattern across subsectors is consistent with our
30Tufano (2004) argues that the more recent decades have also witnessed important ﬁnancial innovations,
but does not provide a breakdown by subsector.
31All these facts can easily be checked using NIPA data. Regressions are available upon request.
21previous historical evidence. First, the subsector most responsible for the increase in the
relative education and the relative wage, Other Finance, is the least regulated one. This
is consistent with evidence from Kostovetsky (2007), who presents evidence for a brain
drain of top managers from mutual funds to less-regulated hedge funds starting in the early
1990s.32 Second, we ﬁnd that the role of IT and software is limited. The IT share in the
capital stock of Insurance and in Credit Intermediation has increased just as much as Other
Finance, but the wage gains are much more modest.
Apart from regulation, we ﬁnd an important role for corporate ﬁnance activities linked
to IPOs and credit risk. Once again, we would not argue that IPOs are exogenous, but
historical research suggest that they are exogenous enough for our purpose. Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2005) have shown that IPO waves follow the introduction of General Purpose
Technologies (GPT), such as electricity (1900-1930) or IT (1970-today). The timing of these
technological revolutions is exogenous, and it explains the bulk of historical ﬂuctuations in
IPOs. Credit risk also increases during and after IPO waves, because young ﬁrms are
volatile, and because they challenge established ﬁrms.
That the quality of human capital employed in the ﬁnancial industry is determined by
the needs of the corporate sector is also important in the current context, because it suggests
that at least some of the observed high wages represent an eﬃcient market response to a
change in the economic environment. In the last section of this paper, we study the extent
to which employees of the ﬁnancial industry earn rents.
3 Are high wages in ﬁnance sustainable?
In the long run, it appears that the most important factors driving the relative skill demand
and relative wages in the ﬁnancial sector are regulation and corporate ﬁnance activity,
followed by ﬁnancial innovation. Our analysis so far, however, says nothing about the
sustainability of the wages paid in the ﬁnancial industry.
Whether ﬁnanciers are overpaid is a very diﬃcult question to answer. The basic issue
is to ﬁnd a benchmark with which to compare the actual wages received by ﬁnanciers. In
other words, ﬁnanciers might be overpaid, but overpaid relative to what? There are two
32Kostovetsky (2007) argues that this lowered returns in mutual funds.
22possible benchmarks. First, one could assess whether ﬁnanciers are paid more than what
that they would be paid under a properly deﬁned “social optimum.” Research in economics
and ﬁnance is not yet at the stage where we can answer that question from ﬁrst principles.
One step towards answering such a question is presented in Philippon (2007), where the
optimal allocation of talent is analyzed in a dynamic general equilibrium model with credit
constraints, career choices and industrial innovations. In that model, the ﬁnancial sector
can drain resources from entrepreneurial activities with positive externalities, but it can
also alleviate the ﬁnancial constraints facing the would-be entrepreneurs. This trade-oﬀ is
important in practice. Unfortunately, many critical inputs of the model are not directly
observable, which makes it impossible to measure the discrepancy between private and
social returns to ﬁnancial jobs. More research is clearly needed in this area.
We therefore consider the following, simpler question: is the ﬁnancial sector in a sustain-
able labor market equilibrium? Or, equivalently: are ﬁnanciers overpaid relative to other
employees with similar characteristics? We have seen that the wages of employees in the
ﬁnancial sector have increased relative to the rest of the private sector. This increase has
b e e na c c o m p a n i e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nt h es h are of college graduates working in the ﬁnancial
sector. In this section we ask whether the change in the composition of the labor force, in
particular its education, can account for all of the observed increase in wages.
There are two ways to address this question. The ﬁrst is to compare groups of workers
who are presumably equally educated and have equal innate ability — one inside and the
other outside of ﬁnance. We therefore compare ﬁnanciers with engineers, all of which
have the same level of education. Given the attraction of many engineers into ﬁnance
in recent years (National Academy of Sciences (2007)) we would expect that these two
groups should be similar, at least at the margin. The other way is to ﬁtw a g er e g r e s s i o n s ,
where we include a ﬁnance indicator, as well as educational and demographic characteristics
of the workforce. We then try to assess whether increases in wages in ﬁnance can be
attributed to increases in unemployment risk. Finally, we propose an estimate that is
robust to unobserved heterogeneity.
233.1 Financiers and engineers
In this section, we focus on a particular comparison, namely that between engineers and
ﬁnanciers with similar levels of education. Figure 7 shows the evolution of the average annual
wages of employees in ﬁnance with a college degree or more, and of engineers employed in
the private sector (but not in ﬁnance). The wages are in constant 2000 prices and the
averages take into account sampling weights (data is taken from the March CPS). The
left panel exhibits wages of individuals with exactly a college degree, and the right panel
exhibits wages of individuals with a post graduate degree. In both cases, the wage of
ﬁnance employees relative to engineers was constant until the 1980s, and then started to
increase faster than the wage of engineers with the same level of education. The picture is
particularly striking for post graduates, a category that includes MBA and Ph.D. graduates.
This situation, in which we ﬁnd that individuals with similar abilities earn diﬀerent
wages points out that wages in the ﬁnancial sector might be in excess of long run equilibrium
wages. We now examine this hypothesis more systematically, using wage regressions.
3.2 Wage regressions





iβ + ui ,( 8 )
where Xi is a vector of individual characteristics that includes controls for educational
categories as in section 1.3, as well as indicators for race, sex, marital status, urban residence,
and (potential) experience and its square. 1
φ
i is an indicator for working in ﬁnance. wi is
the hourly wage of individual i.N o t i c et h a ts i n c et h e s er e g r e s s i o n sa r eﬁt year by year, they
take into account, inter alia, the changing returns to education.
Figure 8 displays estimates of the coeﬃcients of interest, φ, plotted against the year
in which they were estimated. All estimates were statistically diﬀerent from zero.33 The
ﬁgure conﬁrms that individuals working in ﬁnance indeed earn more than observationally
equivalent workers. However, the premium was quite small until 1980, around 5%, at which
point it started to increase dramatically until it reached 20% at the turn of the century. In
33We do not tabulate the results, but they are available upon request.
24untabulated results we ﬁnd a similar pattern for subsectors within ﬁnance.
The beginning of the increase in φ matches the timing of the reduction of regulation.
Since we are controlling for education, this increase cannot be interpreted as an increase in
the (average) returns to education, or skill biased technological change. Thus, we ﬁnd some
more support for wages in excess of equilibrium levels.
3.3 Employment risk and wage diﬀerentials
In the previous section we found that wages in ﬁnance are higher than in other sectors, even
after controlling for education levels. That two individuals with the same education and
observable characteristics earn such diﬀerent income can be explained in one of four ways:
compensating diﬀerentials, employment and wage risk, unobserved heterogeneity and rents.
We did not ﬁnd direct evidence for an increase in wage volatility, so we focus on em-
ployment risk. If ﬁnance workers are more likely to loose their jobs they would have to be
compensated for this extra risk. To test this explanation, we proceed as follows.
Let empit be an indicator for being employed at time t.W e ﬁt the following logit
regressions of the likelihood of becoming unemployed







where f is the logistic function, Xit contains the same vector of observables we used in the
previous section and 1
φ
it is an indicator for working in ﬁnance. We add log(wit),t h el o go f
the hourly wage, in an attempt to capture unobserved heterogeneity. We ﬁt this regression
for eight subsamples of equal size in 1967-2005, {[1967,1970], [1971,1975],. . .[2001,2005]},
and we include year dummies within each subsample.34 The coeﬃcient to the indicator 1
φ
it
captures the additional risk of unemployment for workers in ﬁnance.
The estimation of equation (9) requires a longitudinal dimension. Therefore we use the
Matched CPS in 1967-2005, which allows us to observe each individual in the CPS twice,
in two consecutive years.35
Figure 9 summarizes the evolution of unemployment risk in the ﬁnancial sector relative
to the private sector, as captured by the marginal eﬀect of 1
φ
it from (9) in each of the
34The ﬁrst period includes only the ﬁrst four years of data, 1967 to 1970. All the rest are 5-year intervals.
35See the appendix for a complete description of the methodology involved in matching observations on
individuals from consecutive surveys. For a complete documentation of the variables and output results see
Philippon and Reshef (2007).
25eight subsamples.36 Although ﬁnance employees had safer jobs until the early 1980s, the
relative stability of ﬁnance jobs has decreased over time.37 The timing of the decrease in
unemployment risk coincides with the timing of ﬁnancial deregulation.
We use these results in order to gauge the eﬀect of the rise of unemployment risk on
wages. By calibrating a simple income ﬂuctuations model (see details in the appendix), we
ﬁnd that the increase in unemployment risk could account for 6 percentage points of the
increase in relative wages. We compare this to our estimates of the ﬁnance dummy, φ,f r o m
section 3.2, depicted in Figure 8. It follows that unemployment risk could account for up to
40% of the increase in the excess wage between 1980 and 2005 (6%/(20% − 5%) = 40%).
This still leaves much scope for excess wages, over and above observable characteristics and
unemployment risk.
3.4 A benchmark for the relative wage
Using historical data on the returns to education from Goldin and Katz (2008a), our es-
timates of the relative education in the ﬁnancial sector, and assuming that relative un-
employment risk was the similar in the 1930s and 1990s, we can construct a benchmark
relative wage series for the ﬁnancial sector. Deviations from this benchmark can be driven
by unobserved heterogeneity, or by short term rents (overpay) in the ﬁnancial sector.
The benchmark relative wage in ﬁnance versus the nonfarm private sector is given by
b ωfin = ρfin· (1 + π)+θ,
where ρfin is the relative education level in ﬁnance deﬁn e di n( 2 ) ,π is the skill premium,
and θ captures the eﬀect of diﬀerential unemployment risk. We use our estimates of ρfin,
the estimates of π from Goldin and Katz (2008a) and our own calculations to estimate θ
over time.38
36The probability of becoming unemployed is evaluated for the average worker, i.e., it is evaluated at the
means of all other variables.
37We also ﬁt (9) for three wage groups in order to better capture unobserved heterogeneity. The upward
trend in unemployment risk is maintained for all wage groups that we entertained. See Philippon and Reshef
(2007) for complete details.
38We use the calibration which is described in the appendix to gauge θ under the following assumptions
about the relative risk unemployment. We rely on our estimates for the 1968-2005 period directly. We
assume that from 1950 to 1970 the risk factor was the same as in 1970. We assume that in 1920-1935 there
w a sn oa d d i t i o n a lr i s kt ow o r ki nt h eﬁnancial sector, as in the 1990s. Between 1935 and 1950 we interpolate
linearly.
26Figure 10 shows the actual and benchmark relative wage series. The benchmark relative
wage tracks the actual relative wage well in the middle of the sample. It is important to
remember that in the late 1970s the relative wage is one, but ﬁnance workers are more
educated than in the rest of the economy (see Figure 1). The negative diﬀerential appears to
be well explained by the lower employment risk that ﬁnance workers enjoy. This diﬀerential
disappears over the 1990s, as shown in Figure 9. In 1910-1920 the large returns to education
documented by Goldin and Katz (2008a) account well for the relative wage.
Figure 11 shows the excess relative wage, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the actual
and benchmark relative wages in Figure 10. The late 1920s-early 1930s, and the post 1990
periods stand out as times where wages in the ﬁnancial sector are high relative to the
benchmark. It follows that something other than returns to education, skill intensity and
risk factors have caused the actual wage to deviate from the benchmark. Compensating
diﬀerentials are unlikely to explain the evolution of the excess wage, because ﬁnancial inno-
vations over the past 30 years have made jobs in the ﬁnancial sector more interesting, not
less. We are therefore left with two explanations: rents, and unobserved heterogeneity. We
address this in the next section.
3.5 Controlling for individual heterogeneity
In this section, we ask how much of the increase of relative wages in ﬁnance can be attributed
solely to working in the ﬁnancial sector, over and above education, occupation and innate




itβ + δt + uit ,( 1 0 )
where wit are hourly wages, αi is an individual ﬁxed eﬀect, 1
φ
it is an indicator for working in
ﬁnance, Xit is a vector of individual characteristics, δt are year dummies and uit is the error
term.39 The coeﬃcient ϕ measures the extent to which every ﬁnance employee receives a
higher wage, controlling for all other things, including innate ability.
Xit includes indicators for marital status, urban residence, and continuous variables
(potential) experience and its square. We do not include in Xit educational categories
39We use hourly wages for wit in order to prevent ϕ from capturing potentially longer working days in
ﬁnance relative to the rest of the private sector. Using annual wage earnings delivers similar results. In fact,
the magnitudes of the results using hourly wages stronger.
27because we restrict attention to individuals who have completed their formal education and
therefore their years of education are ﬁxed and their returns to education are absorbed in
αi.40 For the same reason, we do not include in Xit indicators for race and sex.
Equation (10) can only be estimated with longitudinal data. We therefore use the 1967-
2005 Matched CPS, which allows us to observe each individual in the March CPS twice, in
two consecutive years.41 As before, we restrict attention to full time workers in the private
sector, aged 15 to 65, who reported wages greater than 80% of the federal minimum wage.
Since each individual is observed only in two consecutive years, αi captures the trends in the
returns to education and experience, as well as all other factors that are individual speciﬁc
and time invariant.
Table 5, column 1, displays the results of ﬁtting (10). We ﬁnd that ﬁnance employees’
hourly wages are 4.4% higher than in the private sector. Since wages are top coded, this it
is unlikely to capture the largest wage increases for people switching jobs into the ﬁnancial
sector. Moreover, the correct comparison of the estimate of ϕ is to the ﬁnance dummy from
section 3.2, depicted in Figure 8. There, we saw that ﬁnance workers earn on average 10%
more than observationally equivalent workers in the private sector, in the entire sample.
4.4% out of 10% is 44% of the excess wage, which is a large number economically.
Next we ask whether the ﬁnance premium varies by educational attainment. To an-
swer this question we allow ϕ in (10) to vary by educational attainment. These results are
reported in column 2 of Table 5: the ﬁnance premium is higher for higher levels of edu-
cation. College graduates earn 5.8% more, over and above their individual characteristics,
and individuals with more than college degrees earn 8.3% more. It seems that rents are
concentrated on highly educated people. Note that this does not capture higher returns to
education, which are absorbed in αi.
We also ﬁtted (10) to each subsector separately. In those regressions, the indicator 1
φ
it
takes value one for working in one of the ﬁnance subsectors. We estimate that the premium
is 2% in Credit Intermediation, 4.7% in Insurance and 9% in Other Finance.42 The premium
40We excluded a small number of individuals which increased their educational attainment while still
working full time in both years that they were observed. The results are robust to including all these
observations, whether we control for education or not.
41See the data appendix for a complete description of the methodology involved in matching observations
on individuals from consecutive surveys.
42We drop the other two ﬁnance subsectors from the analysis in order to capture only the eﬀect of working
28is highest in the least regulated sector.
Since we saw in Figures 8 and 11 that the excess wage is increasing over time, it is
only natural to ask whether the ﬁnance wage premium is also increasing. We address this
question by estimating (10) for eight subsamples in 1967-2005, {[1967,1970], [1971,1975],
... [2001,2005]}.43
The results are graphed in Figure 12. The ﬁnance premium did not exist before 1986,
but from that point in time it is positive, and on average 6%. Recall that the increase in ϕ
does not capture the increase in returns to education, because all the eﬀect of an individual’s
educational attainment is absorbed in αi. Comparing the increase in the estimates of ϕ after
1986 to the ﬁnance dummy in Figure 8, we see that 30% to 50% of the excess wage can be
explained by factors other than individual ability.44
The magnitude of the increase in the excess wage in Figure 12 is smaller than in Figure
11 (in the 1990s), part of which is due to top coding in the CPS data. However the timing
of the increase in both Figures is remarkably similar. In both cases, excess wages in the
ﬁnancial sector appear only from the mid 1980s onward. Overall, this validates our strategy
of using diﬀerent data sources. The Industry Accounts data is more comprehensive, but
does not allow us to rule out unobserved heterogeneity. The CPS data suﬀers from top
coding, but it gives us better identiﬁcation. We conclude that a large part of the excess
wage in Figures 11 and 12 is due to rents.
4C o n c l u s i o n
While previous analyses of the ﬁnancial sector have focused on ﬁnancial assets, we focus on
the dimension of human capital. In particular, we examine the ﬁnancial sector in terms of
in the particular ﬁnance subsector in focus relative to the private sector, not relative to other subsectors in
ﬁnance. These results are available by request.
43We make sure that within each subsample there are only pairs of observations from each individual.
Individuals whose incidence is at the end of one subsample and at the begining of the following subsample
are excluded. Nevertheless, the results are robust to including these observations.
44In order to make sure that our results are not driven by positive shocks to individuals who switch into
ﬁnance or negative shocks to individuals who leave the sector, we performed two robustness checks. First
we estimated all the speciﬁcations using a sample that includes only individuals who started in the private
sector in the ﬁrst year in which they were observed. In the second robustness check we used a sample of
individuals who all ended up in the private sector in the second year in which they were observed. The ﬁrst
sample includes switchers into ﬁnance, whereas the second includes switchers out of ﬁnance. The results are
all qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar. The estimates from the pooled sample are weighted
averages of the estimates from the two robustness samples. All these results are available upon request.
29its skill composition and relative wages from 1909 to 2005, and we propose explanations for
their evolution.
We document a set of new interrelated, stylized facts: the skill intensity and the com-
p l e x i t yo fj o b si nt h eﬁnancial sector relative to the nonfarm private sector exhibit a U-shape
from 1909 to 2006. Our main conclusion from the analysis of the determinants of the evo-
lution of education and wages in the ﬁnancial sector is that deregulation and corporate
ﬁnance played dominant roles. We ﬁnd a robust and economically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
of deregulation on skill and wages in the ﬁnancial sector, both in the aggregate time series
and across subsectors. Moreover, we show that the nature and timing of regulatory changes
point toward a causal role for deregulation.
We also ﬁnd that corporate ﬁnance activities linked to IPOs and credit risk increase
the demand for skilled labor. Historical evidence on general purpose technologies allows
us to claim that there is a causal impact of corporate ﬁnance on the demand for skills in
the ﬁnancial industry. Linking IPOs and credit risk to technological revolutions is also an
interesting way to conclude our discussion of the IT revolution. We show that the direct
impact of IT is limited: the use of computers by the ﬁnancial industry does not explain its
use of human capital. We also argue, however, that the indirect impact of IT is important:
the creative destruction that IT induces in the non ﬁnancial corporate sector is a key driver
of the demand for skills in the ﬁnancial industry.
Finally, we address the issue of the level of compensation in the ﬁnancial industry. On
the one hand, the change in the relative wage of ﬁnance employees is part of an eﬃcient
market response to a change in the economic environment. We show in particular that
corporate ﬁnance needs from the non ﬁnancial sector help explain the demand for skills in
the ﬁnancial industry. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that rents account for 30% to 50% of the
wage diﬀerentials observed since the late 1990s. In that sense, ﬁnanciers are overpaid.
Our research has two important implications for ﬁnancial regulation. First, tighter
regulation is likely to lead to an outﬂow of human capital out of the ﬁnancial industry.
Whether this is desirable or not depends on one’s view regarding economic externalities.
Baumol (1990), Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) and Philippon (2007) argue that the
ﬂow of talented individuals into law and ﬁnancial services might not be entirely desirable,
because social returns might be higher in other occupations, even though private returns
30are not. Our results quantify the rents earned by employees in the ﬁnancial industry in the
late 1990s and early 2000s. These rents explain the large ﬂow of talent into the ﬁnancial
sector. At this stage, however, we cannot assess whether the inﬂow was too large from a
social perspective.
Our results have another important implication for regulation. Following the crisis of
1930-1933 and 2007-2008, regulators have been blamed for lax oversight.45 In retrospect,
it is clear that regulators did not have the human capital to keep up with the ﬁnancial
industry, and to understand it well enough to be able to exert eﬀective regulation. Given
the wage premia that we document, it was impossible for regulators to attract and retain
highly-skilled ﬁnancial workers, because they could not compete with private sector wages.
Our approach therefore provides an explanation for regulatory failures.46
45The Pecora Hearings of 1933 and 1934 documented such lax oversight and made the case for ﬁnancial
regulation; this led to the Glass-Steagall Act, Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
46Of course, regulators will be able to hire cheap skilled labor in 2009, just as they were able to in the
1930s.
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AD a t a
A.1 Wages
The data come from the Industry Accounts, Kuznets (1941), and Martin (1939). The
industry accounts are prepared by the Current Industry Analysis Division, Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Department of Commerce. The only issue here is to obtain
a consistent industry classiﬁcation. From 1987 to 2006, we use the NAICS classiﬁcation
for “Compensation of employees” (wages and salaries, and supplements) and for “Full-time
equivalent employees.” From 1947 to 1987 we use the SIC classiﬁcation, which itself changes
in 1972. From 1929 to 1946, we use tables 6.2A and 6.5A from the Income and Employ-
ment by Industry, also published by BEA. Mapping the data before and after 1946 requires
adjusting for changes in the classiﬁcation of real estate activities.
Kuznets (1941) gives estimates of net income, wages and salaries and number of em-
ployees separately for banking, insurance, and real estate, over the period 1919-1938. The
banking category, however, covers only commercial banks, savings banks, and federal reserve
banks. Brokerage, investment banking, and other ﬁnancial activities are not included. As
a result, the size of the industry is smaller than the one implied by BEA data. Fortunately,
there is large overlap of 10 years with the BEA data, over which the correlation between the
two series is 96.6%. It seems therefore quite safe to impute values for the period 1919-1928
using Kuznets’ data.
Martin (1939) provides data for the ﬁnance, insurance and real estate, but not for ﬁnance
and insurance only. For the period 1909-1929, the estimates are based on data collected
from banking, insurance and real estate. For the period 1899-1908, however, the 1909
estimate was “projected to 1899 on the basis of other data indicating a probable trend for
this period.” We ﬁnd this procedure questionable, so we truncate our sample in 1909. For
the period 1909-1919, we also collected data from Mitchell (1921) for the banking sector.
The implied banking wage from Mitchell (1921) is quite similar to the implied wage from
Martin (1939) and the Census data to measure the number of employees, except that it
grows slightly faster.
As we have mentioned, the data from Martin (1939) includes real estate. This does not
appear to raise a problem for the long run trends. Using BEA data for the period 1929-2005,
we ﬁnd a correlation of 0.993 between the relative wage series including real estate the and
the wage series excluding real estate .
A.2 Imputing education shares for 1910-1930
For the period 1910-1930, where schooling data is not available we impute the share of
employees with more than high school education by occupation, separately for each sector
(nonfarm private sector and for the ﬁnancial sector). Although occupational classiﬁcations
change across Censuses, IPUMS provides a consistent classiﬁcation for occupations that is
based on the 1950 Census. Essentially, occupational classiﬁcations from other years are
m a t c h e dw i t ht h ec l a s s i ﬁcation of 1950.
We calculate the share of employees with more than high school education in each
occupation c separately for each sector s a c c o r d i n gt ot h i sc l a s s i ﬁcation in 1950, α1950
c,s .W e
use 1950 as a base year rather than 1940 because 1950 contains all possible occupations
a c c o r d i n gt ot h i sc l a s s i ﬁcation, whereas 1940 is missing several. We use α1950
c,s as a base to
impute the share in each sector in 1910-1930 by using the distribution across occupations
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i ωi,s,t is the share of workers in occupation
c in sector s in Census t;a n dωi,t is the sampling weight for that observation.
A.3 Financial deregulation
We construct a measure of ﬁnancial deregulation that takes into account branching restric-
tions, the Glass-Steagall act, interest ceilings, the separation of insurance companies from
banks, and restrictions on the investment opportunities of insurance companies and banks.
(i) Branching
We use the share of the U.S. population living in states that have removed branching
restrictions via mergers and acquisitions. The data is from Black and Strahan (2001). Our
branching deregulation indicator is a continuous variable. It starts at 16.7% in 1960 and
increases to 100% by 1999. We set our indicator at 16.7% from 1927 to 1960. The McFadden
Act of 1927 prevented branching of nationally chartered banks. Before the McFadden Act
branching was less clearly limited. To capture this, we set our indicator to 0.3 in the years
1909-1926.
(ii) Separation of commercial and investment banks
The Glass-Steagall indicator is a continuous variable between 0 and 1. It is 0 until 1932,
0.5 in 1933 and 1 from 1934 to 1986. The Glass-Steagall act is relaxed in 1987, 1989, 1997
and was ﬁnally repealed in 1999, by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. In 2000 this indicator is
back to zero.
(iii) Interest rates ceilings
Ceilings were introduced in 1933 and removed after 1980. Our indicator variable is 0 until
1932, 0.5 in 1933 and 1 from 1934 to 1980. S&Ls were further deregulated by the Garn-
StGermain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. To capture these features, our index moves
gradually to zero between 1980 and 1983.
(iv) Separation of banks and insurance companies
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 prohibited a bank holding company from engaging
in most non-banking activities and from acquiring voting securities of certain companies. It
was repealed in 1999. The Armstrong investigation of 1905 took place before the beginning
of our sample and therefore is not directly relevant.
The deregulation index is given by
deregulation =( i) − (ii) − (iii) − (iv)
A.4 Relative task intensity indices
In order to construct our relative task intensity indices we matched occupational task inten-
sity indices from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) into individual occupations
in the US Censuses from 1910 to 2000 and in the 2008 March CPS (which pertains to 2007).
Five DOT task intensities by occupation (373) and gender (2) were obtained from David
Autor, to which we are grateful for sharing this data. The occupations are classiﬁed accord-
ing to the 1990 Census system. The task intensity measures vary over the [0,10] interval.
We call this data DOT1990. Census and CPS data were extracted from IPUMS.
33DOT task intensities
The DOT task intensities were originally calculated in 1977 by a panel of experts from the
National Academy of Sciences for 3886 DOT occupations. Each occupation was assigned a
vector of characteristics. From this vector we use only ﬁve elements that suﬃciently char-
acterize each occupation: Finger Dexterity (routine manual tasks), Set Limits, Tolerances
and Standards (routine cognitive tasks), Math Aptitude (analytical thinking), Direction,
Control and Planning (decision making) and Eye-Hand-Foot Coordination (captures non-
routine manual tasks).
The 3886 DOT occupations were allocated across 411 occupations of the 1970 Census
classiﬁcation. The task intensity for each 1970 Census occupation is a weighted average
over the tasks of the original DOT occupations that were allocated to it, where the weights
are CPS sampling weights. This was done using the April 1971 CPS (which pertains to
1970). The averages were diﬀerent for men and women, hence the separation by gender.
Each one of the ﬁve indices was detected as a principal component for indices that are
similar in nature (see Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003)). The 1970 Census classiﬁcation
was matched into the 1990 Census classiﬁcation using information based on the OCC1990
variable in IPUMS (this was done by Peter Meyer from the Bureau of Labor Statistics).
Consistent occupational classiﬁcation
In order to match the DOT1990 data to occupations in 1910-2007 we had to create a consis-
tent classiﬁcation system for the entire period. For 1960-2007 we could use the 1990 Census
classiﬁcation directly, using the OCC1990 variable in IPUMS. For 1910-1950 we used the
1950 Census classiﬁcation, using the OCC1950 variable in IPUMS. We created a crosswalk
for OCC1950 into OCC1990 using the 1950 Census, the ﬁrst year for which OCC1990 exists.
We used 1950 as a base for the crosswalk because all Census 1950 occupations appear in
1950. Another option we tried was to use the 1990 Census as the base for the crosswalk;
this had no eﬀect on our results.
When matching the DOT1990 data we had to make a few modiﬁcations. These modi-
ﬁcations are due to the fact that not all of the 1990 Census occupations are represented in
DOT1990. Therefore, we allocated task intensities to these occupations using data for other
occupations that we thought were very similar in nature, ap r i o r i . The only substantial
modiﬁcation was to allocate task intensities to "Professionals, not elsewhere classiﬁed" ac-
cording to the average task intensity for professionals by year, 2-digit industry and gender.
Our results are not aﬀected by dropping all the occupations that were not matched or to
modiﬁcations of these allocations.
Eventually, we constructed a data set with a consistent classiﬁcation of occupations.
The DOT1990 information was then matched into this data set, using the 1990 Census
classiﬁcation and gender. Thus, every individual in the data set has ﬁve task intensity
indices that characterize her occupation.
Aggregation
We restrict attention to workers age 15 to 65, who are employed in the nonfarm private
sector (in 1920 we could only restrict to individuals who were in the labor force). For each
task and year we aggregate up by sector as follows
tasks,t =
P
i∈s taski λi,t hrsi,t P
i∈s λi,t hrsi,t
,
where i denotes a particular individual, t denotes the year, λ are sampling weights and
hrs are annual hours. i ∈ s means that individual i works in sector s,w h e r es = fin
corresponds to the ﬁnancial sector and s = nonfarm corresponds to the nonfarm private
sector. The generic‘task’ varies over all ﬁve tasks described above.
34Unfortunately, it is not possible to calculate hrs for all years. In the 1910-1930 and
1960-1970 Censuses the underlying data to do so is missing. Therefore, in those years we
treat hrs =1for all individuals. The underlying data that is used to calculate hrs is
the number of weeks worked times the number of hours worked per week. The 1910-1930
Censuses do not contain such information at all. In 1940-1950 we use data on hours worked
in the week before the census. The 1960-1970 Censuses contain only categorical data on
weeks and hours worked, according to some ad hoc intervals; we could not calculate hours
worked because we could not adjust for longer hours or more weeks accurately. In the
1980-2000 Censuses, as well as the 2008 March CPS, we use data on usual hours worked
per week. Our attempts to gauge hours and weeks worked in 1960-1970 by using data from
1950, 1980 or both resulted in severe jumps in the task series in those years.
Relative task intensity for ﬁnance for each year is given by
rel_taskfin,t ≡ taskfin,t− tasknonfarm,t .
A.5 The Current Population Survey
Our data on individuals comes from the March supplement of the Current Population Sur-
vey (Annual Social and Economic Study) from survey years 1968-2006, which pertain to
1967-2005 actual years. A CPS year refers to data of the preceding year, i.e. March CPS
2006 documents annual data from calendar year 2005. We therefore adopt the following
taxonomy: We call “year” the actual year that the survey pertains to, while a CPS year is
denoted as “survey year”. The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of
about 50,000 households conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Currently, there are more than 65,000 participating households. The sample is
selected to represent the civilian non-institutional U.S. population. The CPS includes data
on employment, unemployment, earnings, hours of work, and other demographic character-
istics including age, sex, race, marital status, and educational attainment. Also available
are data on occupation, industry, and class of worker. We choose to use only one particular
month survey, the March supplement, for two reasons. First, this supplement contains more
demographic details, in particular on work experience and income sources and amounts.
Since 1976, the survey has also been supplemented with a sample of Hispanic households
(about 2,500 interviewed). Second, it has been extensively used in the empirical labor and
macro-labor literature, which lends to the comparability of our results. Let us now deﬁne
the groups that we use in our empirical analysis. We restrict attention to individuals who
are in the labor force, of at least 15 years of age.
Occupations
Examining the distribution of occupations within ﬁnance and its three subsectors lead us
to choose seven occupation groups (henceforth, "occupations"), which describe the major
occupational groups in our sample. These are: “Managers and Professionals”, “Mathe-
matics and Computers”, “Insurance Specialists” (insurance sales persons, statisticians and
actuaries), “Brokers and Traders”, "Bank Tellers", “Administration, Including Clerks”,
and “All the Rest” (janitors, security and miscellaneous). As with industry classiﬁcations,
major occupational re-classiﬁcations occurred in survey year 1983, from the Census 1970
system to the 1980 system, and in survey year 2003, from the Census 1990 system to the
2000 system. Of these two re-classiﬁcations, the latter was more substantial. We examined
the occupational crosswalks, which are provided by the Census Bureau to make sure that
our occupational groups are consistently deﬁned over time (Census Bureau (1989), Cen-
sus Bureau (2003)). Our criteria for grouping occupations under one title was stability in
occupational shares and relative wages. In some cases we could not consistently separate
35"managers" from "professionals" due to re-classiﬁcations in survey years 1983 and 2003;
some occupations that were deﬁned as "professional" were split and re-classiﬁed as "man-
agerial" and vice versa. However, these two groups together are consistently identiﬁed,
without any "jumps" or "drops" in their employment shares over time, or in their relative
wages. Much eﬀort was devoted to making sure that the other occupation groups are also
consistently deﬁned throughout our sample. Note that some of these occupations poten-
tially mean diﬀerent things in diﬀerent industries. For instance, in Credit Intermediation
the “Managers and Professionals” include “bank oﬃcers”, but these oﬃcers do not exist in
the two other industries. The composition of “Administration, Including Clerks” also varies
across subsectors of ﬁnance. However, our more narrowly deﬁned occupations, “Mathemat-
ics and Computers”, “Insurance Specialists”, “Brokers and Traders” and "Bank Tellers"
are consistently deﬁned.
Industry Classiﬁcation
The ﬁnancial sector includes three industries: “Credit Intermediation”, “Other Finance
Industries”, and “Insurance”. To deﬁne the private sector, we exclude all government
employees, as well as employees of the United States Postal Services. Banks, thrift and
saving institutions are included in “Credit Intermediation”. Securities, commodities, funds,
trusts, and other ﬁnancial investments as well as investment banks are all included in
“Other Finance Industries”. These sectors are consistently identiﬁed, without any "jumps"
or "drops" in their shares of total employment, despite changes in industrial classiﬁcations
in the CPS in our sample, which occur following each decennial census. The major industrial
re-classiﬁcations occurred in survey year 1983, from the Census 1970 system to the 1980
system; and in survey year 2003, from the Census 1990 system to the 2000 system. Of
these two re-classiﬁcations, the latter was more substantial overall, yet it does not aﬀect
our sectors. The Census Bureau provides industrial crosswalks for the 1970-1980 systems
and for the 1990-2000 systems, from which one can gauge how some industries are split or
merged into others (Census Bureau (1989), Census Bureau (2003)). These crosswalks are
basically a transition matrix for all industries from one classiﬁcation to the other. A close
examination of these transition "probabilities" lead us to conclude that our industries are
consistently deﬁned throughout our sample. In the transition from the 1970 system to the
1980 system 99.9% remain inside each industry; and for the transition from the 1990 system
to the 2000 system over 95% of workers remain inside each industry. This is due to the fact
that the functions of our three industries are narrowly and well deﬁned, and due to the fact
that they are not too large.
Education and experience
Educational Categories are "Less than 12 years of schooling", "High School Graduate", "13-
15 Years of Schooling", "College Graduate" (4-year college), "More than College" (graduate
degrees, such as JD, MBA, Ph.D.). Until survey year 1991 years of education are reported
in annual steps, starting with 0 years till 18 years (which also absorbs instances of more
than 18 years). Also until survey year 1991 we correct years of schooling for individuals
who did not complete the last year in school by subtracting one year. This correction is
not needed after survey year 1992. From survey year 1992 and on early school attainment
is lumped into groups: 0 years, 1-4 years, 5-6 year and 7-8 years. Also starting in survey
year 1992 school attainment starting with high school is marked by degrees, not years,
therefore it is not possible to distinguish between, e.g., 13, 14 and 15 years of school. To
make our education variable consistent throughout our sample, we adopt the coding that
starts in survey year 1992, i.e., we group early school attainment into brackets for all the
sample and assign maximal values to each bracket. Also, we group 13, 14 and 15 years of
school together and assign 14 years for all individuals within that bracket in all years. In
36addition, we lump 17 years of schooling together with 16 years, for similar reasons. This
makes the educational shares smooth throughout the sample, and in particular around the
1991-1992 surveys. Experience is potential labor market experience. It is measured as
min{age−edu−6;age−18},w h e r e‘ edu’ is years of schooling. The CPS does not contain
data on job spells.
Wages and top-coding
We deﬂate all wages reported in the CPS using the deﬂator for personal consumption
expenditures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The reference year is 2000. Hourly
wages are calculated by dividing annual wage income by number of hours worked. The
CPS underestimates the income of individuals who earn very high salaries, due to top-
coding of income. Therefore, the wages that we report may not be accurate for certain
occupations, Securities and Financial Asset Sales in particular. In our sample, the percent
of top-coded observations in the private sector increases from 0.06% in 1967 to 1.1% in
1980, after which it ﬂuctuates in the range 0.38%-1.6%, due to secular adjustments of the
top-coding income limit. However, in the ﬁnancial sector there are many more incidents
of top-coding: in Credit Intermediation there are on average twice as many top-coded
observations, in Insurance there are on average 2.4 as many top-coded observations, whereas
in Other Finance Industries there are on average 13 times as many top-coded observations.
This leads to an under-estimation of relative wages in the ﬁnancial sector. In an attempt
to compensate for this, we multiply top-coded incomes in all survey years until 1995 by a
factor of 1.75. From survey years 1996 and on, top-coded incomes are average amounts of
actual earnings for 12 socioeconomic cells; therefore we do not adjust them.
A.6 Construction of Matched CPS
We thank Donghoon Lee for providing us with his methodology. The "Matched CPS" takes
advantage of the fact that households in the CPS are sampled for more than a year, in the
following pattern. Each household that enterst h es u r v e ya ta n yg i v e nm o n t hi ss a m p l e df o r
four months, leaves for eight months, and then returns for four more months, after which it
exits. Therefore, theoretically, every household that is surveyed in March of any given year
must have been surveyed in the previous March, or will be surveyed in the next. Of course,
in practice not all individuals get surveyed twice due to survey attrition, non-compliance,
etc.’.
Unfortunately, the CPS does not hold a deﬁnitive person ID, by which one could easily
match two observations on the same individual from two consecutive surveys. The following
methodology is used to match observations on the same individual from two consecutive
surveys. We match individual observations from two consecutive surveys by household ID,
their "line" within the household (which is an intra-household identiﬁer), state of residence,
race, sex and year of birth. These are supplemented with a few more identiﬁers generated
by the CPS (segment number, serial number and a random cluster code). We make sure
that there are only two observations within each cell deﬁned by these identiﬁers and drop
all other cells.
Some survey years cannot be matched. Survey year 1968 cannot be matched backwards,
because our sample starts with that survey year. Likewise, survey year 2006 cannot be
matched forward, because our sample ends with that survey year. Other survey years
that cannot be matched for technical reasons are 1971, 1972, 1976, 1985, 1995 and 2001.
Approximately 93% of all observations are actually matched from within survey years that
can be matched.
Deﬁnition of unemployment
37Here we give the exact deﬁnition of our unemployment indicator. A person would get a
positive indication of unemployment if:
1. did not work last year and reported: could not ﬁnd work, looking for work or on layoﬀ.
2. in survey years 1968-1993 major activity in the week before the survey was looking
for work.
3. in survey years 1968-1993 did not work last week due to being laid-oﬀ.
4. in survey years 1994-2006 reported being on layoﬀ or looking for work.
5. in survey years 1968-1988 reported reason for working part year was looking for work
or being unemployed.
6. reported positive number of weeks looking for work last year.
7. reported positive number of weeks being unemployed last year.
Since the sample for our transition regressions includes only people that were not un-
employed in the ﬁrst year they were surveyed, this eventually reduces our sample.
B Unemployment risk calibration
Based on the evidence presented so far, we can propose a ﬁrst interpretation of the data.
Regarding the level of compensation, a constant compensating diﬀerential appears to be
required, since even in the more recent years, the unemployment risk in the ﬁnance industry
is not higher than in the rest of the economy. It has merely converged to the same level.
The increase in the relative unemployment risk in the ﬁnancial sector can however account
for some of the increase in relative wages. Ruhm (1991) ﬁnds that layoﬀs lead to temporary
unemployment and long lasting decreases in earnings: “Displaced workers were out of work
eight weeks more than their observably similar counterparts in the year of the separation,
four additional weeks in period t+1, and two extra weeks at t+2.B yy e a rt+3they were
jobless only 1.5 weeks more than the peer group, and the t +4increase was just six days.”
By contrast, “almost none of the t +1wage reduction dissipated with time. The earnings
gap remained at 13.8 percent and 13.7 percent, respectively, in years t +3and t +4 .”
A complete study of the eﬀects of unemployment risk on the level of compensation that is
needed to keep workers indiﬀerent between diﬀerent jobs is clearly beyond the scope of this
paper. Nonetheless, we think it is useful to provide some simple benchmark calculations.
We do so in the simplest framework possible and we assume that labor income is the only
source of risk and that the utility function has constant relative risk aversion. We set the
personal discount rate and the market rate both equal to 3% per year. We assume that
workers live and work for 40 years, and that the labor income process, yt,i sg i v e nb y
yt+1 =
½
1.02 yt with probability 1 − p
0.9 yt with probability p
¾
,a n dy1 given.
The increase of 2% captures the normal increase in real labor income. The drop by 10%
captures the income loss from displacement documented by Ruhm (1991). This process
implies that shocks are permanent, which makes the eﬀect of unemployment risk more
important, so we are likely to obtain an upper bound for the impact on the relative wages.
38We perform the following experiment. First, we set p =4 .41% and y1 =1 ,w es o l v e
and simulate the model with a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion equals to 2. We then
increase the unemployment risk to p =6 .91%. This increase of 2.5 points corresponds to
the increase in relative unemployment risk that we have documented earlier. In order to
keep workers indiﬀerent, the new starting wage should be y1 =1 .063,a ni n c r e a s eo f6 % .
If we lower the calibrated risk aversion to 1, the required increase in wages is 6%. If we
increase risk aversion to 3, the required increase in wages is 6.6%.
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Credit Intermediation ‐0.571 0.402 ‐0.230 0.031 1.411 0.043
Other Finance ‐0.933 0.118 ‐0.110 ‐0.039 1.339 ‐0.053
Insurance ‐0.488 0.480 ‐0.234 0.009 1.333 0.011
‐0.574 0.002
B. 1960‐1980
Credit Intermediation ‐0.149 0.452 ‐0.068 0.070 1.050 0.073
Other Finance 0.259 0.100 0.026 0.003 1.002 0.003
Insurance ‐0.005 0.448 ‐0.002 ‐0.073 1.087 ‐0.079
‐0.044 ‐0.003
C. 1980‐2005
Credit Intermediation 0.308 0.481 0.148 ‐0.012 1.130 ‐0.014
Other Finance 2.494 0.125 0.313 0.048 2.379 0.114

























Credit Intermediation 0.412 0.492 0.203 ‐0.024 1.090 ‐0.027
Other Finance 0.383 0.130 0.050 0.107 2.271 0.242
Insurance 0.160 0.378 0.060 ‐0.082 1.195 ‐0.098
0.313 0.117
B. Education
<12 Years 0.068 0.021 0.001 ‐0.019 0.626 ‐0.012
High School 0.067 0.315 0.021 ‐0.219 0.787 ‐0.172
13‐15 Years 0.060 0.295 0.018 0.017 0.972 0.016
College Graduate 0.208 0.280 0.058 0.155 1.772 0.274
More than College 0.607 0.088 0.054 0.066 2.593 0.172
0.152 0.278
C. Occupations
Other ‐0.043 0.026 ‐0.001 0.002 0.919 0.002
Managers and Professionals 0.229 0.371 0.085 0.181 1.687 0.305
Math and Computer 0.402 0.032 0.013 0.039 1.477 0.058
Insurance Specialists 0.067 0.087 0.006 ‐0.062 1.390 ‐0.086
Brokers and Traders ‐0.167 0.066 ‐0.011 0.067 2.670 0.180
Bank Tellers 0.002 0.076 0.000 ‐0.053 0.521 ‐0.028











0.430(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0215*** 0.0194*** 0.0177*** 0.183*** 0.174*** 0.113***
(0.00174) (0.00228) (0.00235) (0.0140) (0.0152) (0.0189)
4.713** 4.204* 21.02 19.30





0.000303*** ‐0.000177 ‐0.000180 0.00109 ‐0.00100 ‐0.00309
(0.000073) (0.000243) (0.000268) (0.000879) (0.00182) (0.00193)
Sample 1910‐2005 1910‐2005 1910‐2005 1909‐2006 1909‐2006 1909‐2006
Observations 96 96 96 98 98 98


















































Table 5: The Finance Premium1967‐1970 71‐75 76‐80 81‐85 86‐90 91‐95 96‐00 2001‐2005
Finance Indicator ‐0.022 0.023 0.026 ‐0.029 0.080*** 0.057*** 0.038*** 0.065***
(0.019) (0.028) (0.018) (0.020) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 58134 43037 111846 100212 125733 89087 119618 145845
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1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010Figure 12: Excess Wage, Fixed Effects Estimate
Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of Finance dummy from regression controlling for individual fixed effects. See text for 
estimation details. Data: Matched CPS.